, at 1-2 (insanity defense under attack); Nat'l L. J., May 3, 1982 , at 1 (is insanity defense breaking down?); 109 N.J.L.J., May 27, 1982, at 8, col . 2 (Idaho abolishes the insanity defense); 95 L.A. Daily J., June 23, 1982 , at 1, col. 6 (Hinckley prompts call for reform); 95 L.A. Daily J., July 7, 1982, at 4, col. 3 (pro "guilty but insane" verdict); 95 L.A. Daily J., August 11, 1982 , at 4, col. 1 (against "guilty but mentally ill"); 110 N.J.L.J., August 12, 1982, at 7, col. 2 (Hinckly aftermath) .
Numerous commentators have advocated abolishing the insanity defense and removing from the criminal trial the choice between medical and penal treatment of a convicted defendant. See United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 920, 927 (4th Cir. 1968 ) (penologists, rather than trial court, should determine criminal responsibility of defendant who raises insanity defense); AMERICAN LJ. 853, 869-71 (1963) (new laws rather than the insanity defense are necessary to deal with insane individuals who have committed crimes); Pugh, The Insanity Defense in Operation: A Practicing Psychiatrist Views Durham and Brawner, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 87, 106-08 (commitment for psychiatric treatment should be considered at sentencing, not at adjudication of guilt). But see Brawner, 471 F.2d at 985-86 (reassessment of viability of insanity defense is for the legislative branch, not the judiciary). Other commentators believe that the defense comprises so integral a part of the common law that abolition might violate the accused's constitutional right of due process. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra, 378-79; A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 222-23 (1967) ; Dershowitz, Abolishing the Insanity Defense: The Most Signifcant Feature of the Administration's Proposed Criminal Code-An Essay, 9 CRIM. L. BULL. 434, 436 (1973) (insanity defense has traditional place in our legal system).
Several Supreme Court justices have proposed changes in the exclusionary rule. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 , 2336 -51 (1983 (White, J., concurring) and Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590, 611-13 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part) (advocating adoption of good faith exception to exclusionary rule); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 420-23 (1971) (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (exclusion is an "anomalous and ineffective mechanism" and Congress should evaluate the rule and adopt a more effective alternative); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 490 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (search and seizure law in general should be completely overhauled); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 468 (1928) (exclude evidence only where admission would violate constitutional rights). Commentators have also advocated reform; for a sampling, see Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1964)(exclusion has not successfully deterred illegal law enforcement; proposes civil commission to review unconstitutional acts); Burns, Mapp v. Ohio: An All American Mistake, 19 DEPAUL L. REV. 80 (1969) (exclusionary rule and fourth amendment enforcement generally should be placed in hands of states); Oaks, Studying the Exclsionagy Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 720-57 (1970) (rule is ineffective deterrent of illegal searches); see also Wingo, Growing Disillusionment with the ExclsionaV Rule, 25 Sw. L.J. 573 (1971) and Wright, supra note 8 (narrow application of rule by invoking only when violation is substantial).
burden of proof for this defense. 29 The Supreme Court has limited the exclusionary rule so that illegal evidence must automatically be excluded only from the prosecution's direct case, ie., where the prosecution must establish the guilt of the accused. 30 Specifically, the constitutionality of admitting illegal evidence to rebut the insanity defense depends upon whether proof of sanity is an element of a crime that the prosecution must prove as part of its case in chief. 3 ' Judges and commentators disagree as to whether insanity and mens rea can coexist.32 Some urge that insanity completely negates mens rea, and therefore proof of insanity is an essential element of the crime. 33 Others maintain that mens rea exists separately from insanity, thus proof of sanity is completely separate from proof of the crime charged.
34
This Comment analyzes whether the practical effects of using illegal evidence to rebut the insanity defense are consistent with current exclusionary jurisprudence, and concludes that the insanity-rebuttal exception is proper under certain circumstances. This Comment argues that this exception to the exclusionary rule conforms to the traditional exclusionary rationale for the impeachment exception. Moreover, the insanity-rebuttal exception is well-suited to the context of the insanity defense because it ensures that the trier-of-fact will receive all relevant information on the issue of the defendant's sanity.
II. THE DETERRENCE RATIONALE AS A BASIS FOR EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A. THE DETERRENCE RATIONALE From the inception of the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United States, 35 courts and commentators alike have debated the theoretical rationale underlying the rule. 36 The judiciary and commentators have ad- 484-85 (1895) . 34 Note, Mens Rra and Insanip,, 28 ME. L. REv. 500, 511 (1976) . For further discussion of the relationship between insanity and mens rea, see in/a notes 144-161 and accompanying text.
35 232 U. S. 383 (1914) .
36 Justice Blackmun explicitly noted that "the evolution of the exclusionary rule has been marked by sharp divisions in the Court." United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 n.15 (1976) . For a sample of commentators' debates over the theories and efficacy of the exclusionary rule, compare J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 78-79 (1966) ?, 62 JUDICATURE 214, 222, 227 (1978) (application of exclusionary rule leads to total distortion of truth and it should be discarded). 37 Under the personal right or privacy theory, the victim of an illegal search and seizure is entitled to judicial exclusion of any illegally seized evidence as a matter of personal right. See J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 36, at 78-79. The Weeks Court apparently followed this theory in holding that the Constitution requires the police to return illegally obtained evidence to the accused. 232 U.S. at 392, 397-98. In Weeks, a United States Marshall conducted a warrantless search of the defendant's home and seized personal letters which implicated Weeks in a numbers racket. Id. at 387-88. The defendant asserted that this search violated his constitutional rights, demanding that the letters be returned to him. Id. at 389. The Court initially stated that all persons, innocent or guilty, are entitled to resort to the courts to vindicate their fourth amendment rights. Id. at 392. The Court concluded that use of evidence obtained illegally against an accused would emasculate the guarantees of the fourth amendment. Id. While the Court excluded the letters from evidence and ordered their restoration to Weeks, it did not specifically state that he was personally entitled to them. Id. at 392-94.
The Weeks personal right theory has eroded to the point that an accused has no absolute right to retrieve illegally seized evidence, see Welsh v. United States, 220 F.2d 200, 202 (D.C. Cir. 1955) , to seek redress in the courts, see Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954), or have illegally obtained evidence excluded, id.; see also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) (purpose of exclusionary rule is not to redress injury to the privacy of search victim because" 'the ruptured privacy of the victims' homes and effects cannot be restored' ") (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965) ). Moreover, the Court has stated outright that exclusion is not a constitutional right in and of itself, but merely a device created to effectuate fourth amendment guarantees. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482, 486 (1976) . Justice Rehnquist applied this rationale to exclude evidence obtained in violation of Miranda in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446-49 (1974) .
38 The premise of the judicial integrity rationale is that the judiciary should not acquiesce in violations of the fourth amendment. The Weeks Court suggested this rationale when it warned that obtaining criminal convictions by unlawful means "should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution.
... 232 U.S. at 392; see also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223-24 (1960) . By excluding illegally obtained evidence, a court avoids legitimizing unconstitutional police conduct. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968) ; see Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532 REV. , 1562 REV. (1972 .
The Court's use of the judicial integrity rationale has declined since its decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) , when it extended the exclusionary rule to state prosecutions under the fourteenth amendment, overruling its earlier decision in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949) . See Kamisar, supra note 36. This decline has coincided with Supreme Court decisions limiting application of the exclusionary sanction. These decisions allow judicial acquiescence in police misconduct under certain circumstances, and are thus antithetical to the judicial integrity rationale. J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 36, at 76-77. Justice White, dissenting in Powell, pointed out the fallacies underlying the judicial integrity argument. Justice White argued that judges are not rendered participants in fourth amendment violations if they do not exclude illegally obtained evidence because "[e]xclusion of the evidence does not cure the invasion of the defendant's rights which he has already suffered." 428 U.S. at 540. Furthermore, when reliable and probative evidence is kept from the trier of fact, the entire truthfinding process is substantially impaired. Id. This in turn leads to a weakening of the public's conception ofjudicial integrity. Kaplan, The Limits ofthe Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. these rationales, deterrence has emerged as the primary justification for the exclusionary rule.40
The basic premise of the deterrence theory is that exclusion of illegally obtained evidence will "compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it.
' ' 41 Law enforcement personnel will respect fourth amendment rights because they learn that illegal searches and seizures will not produce admissible evidence.
4 2 Thus, the goal of the exclusionary rule is "to prevent, not to repair," or to protect the general public from future police misconduct rather than to redress the accused's constitutional rights or to ensure judicial integrity. 4 3 In UnitedStates v. Calandra, 4 4 the Court went so far as to characterize deterrence as the sole purpose of the rule. 45 Although the Court has consistently recognized that all courts must be concerned with preserving the integrity of the judicial process, 4 6 it has explicitly stated that "this concern has limited force as a justification for the exclusion of highly probative evidence. 4 7 Furthermore, where the deterrent effect is insubstantial or "incremental," there is no reason for exclusion of the illegally obtained evidence. 48 Deterrence is the narrowest of the three rationales advanced for the exclusionary sanction. Even in its present limited form, the exclusionary rule has generated extensive criticism. Much of this commentary has centered on the 1027, 1036 n.53 (1974) . For further discussion of how exclusion impairs the truthfinding process, see infra text accompanying notes 64-78. Despite Justice White's valid arguments, the Court continues to recognize that "judicial integrity" is a relevant, although subordinate, factor in exclusionary jurisprudence. See United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 458 n.35 (1976) . REV. 740 (1974) . Chief Justice Burger fails to see how the police are deterred by a judicial ruling on suppression which never affects them personally, and of which they learn (if at all) long after having "forgotten the details of the particular episode which occasioned suppression." Burger, supra note 28, at 11. This fact was recognized by the Court injanis, 428 U.S. at 458, where it stated that the imposition of the exclusionary rule in a civil tax proceeding would have an insignificant deterrent effect since "[i]t falls outside the offending officer's zone of primary interest." The Court also took notice of the suggestion of some commentators that the police often view "trial and conviction as a lesser aspect of law enforcement." Id. at 448 n.20.
51 See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 540 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (only consequence of rule as presently administered is unimpeachable and probative evidence is kept from trier of fact, substantially impairing truthfinding function or even totally aborting the trial); Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("the history of the suppression doctrine demonstrates that it is both conceptually sterile and practically ineffective in accomplishing its stated objective [of giving meaning to constitutional guarantees against unlawful conduct by government officials]"); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954) (exclusion does not punish the official for his or her misconduct but it is likely to result in release of a guilty defendant); People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926) (Cardozo, J.) ("The criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered"); Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255. A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 378, 389 (1964) ("[rule's] deterrent efficacy at some stage reaches a point of diminishing returns, and beyond that point its continued application is a public nuisance"); Burger, supra note 28, at 12 (suggesting that a vast number of people are losing respect for law and the administration ofjustice because they think that the supression doctrine is defeating justice); Oaks, supra note 28, at 739-49 (rule encourages police to give false testimony, fosters delay and diverts focus of trial from guilt or innocence of the accused); Paulsen, The Exc/usionaiy Rule and M'isconduct by the Police, 52 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci., 255, 256 (1961) and-most notably in cases proposing a new exception or seeking application of an already existing one-has increasingly found that "the societal interest in presenting probative evidence to the trier of fact" far outweighs the interest in deterring illegal police conduct. 58 The Court has reasoned that the rule sufficiently discourages police misconduct if the prosecution is prevented from using illegal evidence to fulfill its constitutional burden of establishing all elements of the crime charged.
59
For example, the Court has refused to extend the rule to grand jury proceedings. The Court has reasoned that the need to keep the grand jury unimpeded by an evidentiary rule that would only delay and disrupt the proceedings outweighs any incremental deterrence benefits. 165, 174-75 (1969) ; see also Amsterdam, supra note 51, at 389.
58 Payner, 447 U.S. at 736 n.8. In Payner, the defendant was not the one whose fourth amendment rights were violated, thus he lacked standing to invoke the rule. Id. at 735-37.
59 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) . Under certain circumstances, the "speculative possibility that impermissible police conduct will be encouraged" by admission of illegal evidence is outweighed by the need to present all relevant information to the trier of fact. Id. It is well-settled that illegally obtained evidence is admissible in federal probation revocation hearings. The courts have reasoned that exclusion of such evidence from the determination of guilt achieves the maximum deterrent effect. Any additional deterrence that might flow from also excluding the evidence at probation revocation hearings would be minimal. See United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1975 
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COMMENTS directed toward discovering evidence solely for a grand jury; 6 1 the inadmissibility of the evidence in a subsequent criminal prosecution negates this incentive. 62 Finally, the Court stressed that grand juries do not finally adjudicate guilt or innocence.
C. THE IMPEACHMENT EXCEPTION
Beginning with Wa/der v. United Stales,64 the Supreme Court has restricted application of the exclusionary rule so as not to impair the accuracy of the truthfinding process, stressing that the ascertainment of truth "is a fundamental goal of our legal system." ' 65 The WaIder Court created the impeachment exception, allowing the prosecution to use physical evidence, inadmissible to establish the guilt of the accused, for impeachment purposes. 66 The Court reasoned that the principles underlying the exclusionary rule do not justify allowing a defendant to commit perjury "in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility.
'67
The Court extended this exception in Harris v. New York.6 While Walder had been impeached with physical evidence relating to testimony in his direct examination, 69 Harris was impeached with Mirandaviolative statements that bore directly on the crimes charged.
70 Never- 63 Id. at 349. Similarly, in the context of civil tax proceedings, the Court refused to extend the rule because "the deterrent effect of the exclusion of relevant evidence is highly attenuated when the 'punishment' imposed upon the offending criminal enforcement officer is the removal of that evidence from a civil suit by or against a different sovereign." Janis, 428 U.S. at 458. Because the use of the illegal evidence "falls outside the offending officer's zone of primary interest," exclusion from a civil case would not deter the officer. Id. The Court has also held that only the victim of the challenged practices may invoke the exclusionary rule. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 134 (1978) . The Court is unconvinced that any additional deterrence to be gained from allowing third parties, whose fourth amendment rights have not been violated, to assert violations of others' fourth amendment rights justifies "further encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth." Id at 137 (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969) The criminal sanction is grounded on the idea that human conduct is based on free choice; in fact, the sanction functions as though human beings have free choice.
8 3 The mentally ill, however, have impaired volitional capacities. This impairment is given legal recognition in the form of the insanity defense, under which such persons cannot be punished. 637, 648 (1978) (public hostility derives from widespread belief that insane offenders are treated with greater leniency and are "back on the streets" sooner than their sane counterparts). The public's sense of insecurity about insane defendants has grown with the increasing skepticism about the abilities of psychiatrists to determine when mentally ill criminals are well enough to return to society. Note, supra note 79, at 237-38. While the public is apprehensive, defendants have their own misgivings about raising the insanity defense. Defendants are usually reluctant to plead insanity except when confronted by the death sentence or long imprisonment. A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 24. Moreover, the insanity verdict leads to an indeterminate commitment in a maximum security mental hospital, an unattractive alternative to a penal institution in the eyes of most defendants. A. MATTHEWS 
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defendant "has committed all the elements of a proscribed offense." ' 5 The defense places in issue the existence of a particular mental state necessary to the commission of the crime, although it is not limited to that particular mental state. The defendant is not released until he or she is cured. Although the theory of the insanity defense is that the insane cannot be held responsible and thus should not be subjected to imprisonment, W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 81, § 36 at 268, several commentators have pointed out that being termed insane and committed to a mental institution stigmatizes the defendant just as much as a sentence in a penal institution would. Moreover, institutionalization of an accused has clear penal overtones, but mandatory commitment statutes have survived constitutional attack. Note, supra, at 737 & n.22. One commentator has also argued that the present insanity tests, see infta notes 91-121 and accompanying text, do not fulfill the therapeutic and protective goals of mandatory commitment. Since none of the tests "[focus] on either the defendant's amenability to treatment or his danger to the community. . . they do not determine whether he should be set free or confined to an institution." Note, supra, at 742.
90 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4. 01, comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) . For another view, see Goldstein and Katz, supra note 28.
COMMENTS
All of these tests share two criteria: evidence of a mental disease or defect, and evidence of a causal relationship between the mental disease or defect and the criminal act.
92
The traditional and prevailing rule is the M'Naghten test. 93 Under this rule, the defendant cannot be convicted if at the time of committing the act the accused was laboring under a disease of the mind or a defect of reason such that she or he did not know the nature and quality of the act or, if the accused did know it, she or he did not know that the act was wrong. 94 Commonly described as the "right-wrong" test, the M'Naghten rule prescribes a narrow definition for insanity. 95 "Only the defendant's lack of knowledge of the nature of the conduct or inability to recognize those actions as legally or morally impermissible constitutes criminal incapacity. ' 96 Moreover, this test requires total impairment; temporary or partial mental incapacity is not a sufficient basis for a finding of insanity.
97
Courts have criticized the MANaghlen test as based on outmoded concepts of the nature of insanity.
98 By focusing exclusively on cognitive ability, the test fails to address behavioral and emotional incapacities.
99 Furthermore, the rule restricts expert testimony. 100 Since the rule directs the inquiry to ethical and moralistic rather than scientific con- Simants, 197 Neb. 549, 250 N.W. 2d 881, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878 (1977); Nev., Ogden v. State, 96 Nev. 258, 607 P.2d 576 (1980) ; N.J., State v. Trantino, 44 NJ. 358, 209 A.2d 117 (1965 ), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 993 (1966 have viewed the product test as illusory "because no psychiatrist would be able to deny the possibility of a causal connection between the illness and the act," thus permitting the conclusion that a defendant is never criminally responsible for any acts following the onset of a mental abnormality. 1 10 The Durham product rule might also tend to cause juries to rely exclusively on expert testimony in making determinations of mental disease or defect."' The magnitude of the problem of conclusory expert testimony eventually led even Judge Bazelon, the author of the Durham opinion, to reject the product test. pretestimonial instruction of expert witnesses to ensure that the jury is informed of the experts' underlying reasons and approach, and is "not confronted with ultimate opinions on a take-it-or-leave-it basis." Id. at 1006; see also id. at 1006 n.82, 1008 (Note to Appendix B). The court thus emphasized that the jury is not to be made to feel that it is foreclosed from its own evaluation of the defendant's sanity by the opinions of experts.
118 See Brawner, 471 F.2d at 1027 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part) ("Where a psychiatrist would formerly have testified that the act was not the 'product' of the disease, he can now assert that the disease of the defendant does not entail as a 'result' the kind of impairment that could have produced the act in question."). 119 Wade, 426 F.2d at 77-78 (Trask, J., dissenting). Fear of such personal interpretation by jurors has also led courts and commentators alike to reject a fifth insanity test, the "justly responsible" rule, included as an alternative to the majority ALI test. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 alternative (a) to 1 (1) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955 (dictum) , that to require the government to prove defendant's sanity in is an issue, the defendant must initially meet the burden of production on that issue; 129 should defendant fail, the prosecution does not have to put forward any evidence of sanity.13 0 Authorities differ, however, concerning who has the ultimate burden of proof of insanity-the risk of nonpersuasion31-and by what measure.' 32 The defendant must persuade by a preponderance of the evidence in some jurisdictions, while in others the prosecution must persuade beyond a reasonable doubt. 3 3 One commentator suggests that courts and legislatures have based their allocation of the burden of persuasion for insanity on their perception of the relationship between sanity and mens rea. Under one view, the presumption of sanity is merely a procedural convenience to relieve the prosecution of proving sanity when it is not in issue.1 35 Once the defendant has satisfied the burden of production, the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, and the presumption of sanity has no further evidentiary significance. t36 The rationale for this view is that a mentally diseased person is incapable of committing a crime. 137 This definition of sanity posits that sanity is necessary to form the requisite culpable state of mindmens rea-and hence is an essential element of the crime. 138 Therefore, in jurisdictions where proof of insanity is considered "inseparable from every case "would seriously delay and embarrass the enforcement of the laws against crime, and in most cases be unnecessary."
129 Practice varies as to how much evidence the defendant must introduce to place insanity in issue. The prevailing view is that an accused must produce enough evidence to raise a reasonable doubt of his or her mental responsibility for an act. W. LAFAvE & A. Sco-rrsura note 81, § 40 at 313. Some states, however, require only a "scintilla" of evidence. Id. 138 SeeDavis, 160 U.S. at 484-85. Although the Supreme Court in Davis adopted a "rule of procedure for the federal courts" by requiring the government to negate insanity beyond a reasonable doubt once the defendant introduced evidence on that issue, Leland, 343 U.S. at 797-98, as a constitutional matter legislatures could require the defendant to prove his or her insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 797-99 (dictum). For further discussion of Supreme Court decisions affecting the burden of proof, see infra note 143.
1983]

COMMENTS
[Vol. 74 the ascertainment of guilt,"' 39 the prosecution bears the burden of proving the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.' 40 The opposing view is that the prosecution can establish guilt separately from proof of sanity, therefore the defendant must bear the burden of persuasion as well as that of production. 141 In most jurisdictions applying this rule, the defendant must establish insanity by a preponderance of the evidence, a less demanding quantum of proof than the beyond reasonable doubt standard. Id. § 8 at 47-48. Under Leland, however, the defendant can be required to prove his insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. 343 U.S. at 798-99; see also supra note 138.
142 See, e.g., Phillips v. State, 86 Nev. 720, 722, 475 P.2d 671, 672 (1970) ("Whether insanity is an element of the crime of murder which must be proven by the state is a question that has been well-settled. Insanity is an affirmative proposition which the defendant must establish by a preponderance of proof."), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 940 (1971); see also Commonwealth v. Donough, 377 Pa. 46, 50, 103 A.2d 694, 697 (1954) (dictum that defendant has burden of proving affirmative defenses of insanity, alibi and self-defense by a fair preponderance of the evidence). The Supreme Court of Washington advanced another rationale in State v. Clark, 34 Wash. 485, 497-98, 76 P. 98, 102 (1904) , where it stated that because insanity is "easily feigned, and difficult to disprove," it is right in principle to impose the burden of persuasion of insanity on the defendant. See generally, Note, supra note 34. Under this view, the treatment of the insanity defense is analogous to a bifurcated trial in which the determination of guilt is made in a separate proceeding prior to the determination of insanity. Note, supra note 95, at 503 n.34. For further discussion of bifurcation, insanity and mens rea, see infia note 161.
143 See Note, supra note 95, at 503 n.35 (collecting cases and commentary); D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(j) (1981) . In Davis, 160 U.S. at 484-85, the Supreme Court established a rule of procedure for federal courts, holding that the prosecution must negate insanity beyond a reasonable doubt once the defendant introduces evidence on the issue. In Leland, however, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a state statute placing the burden of proof on the defendant. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952) . The Court found that requiring the defendant to prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt was not inconsistent with the prosecution's burden of establishing deliberate and premeditated killing beyond a reasonable doubt, id. at 794-95, since the state did not require the accused to disprove the prosecution's showing of the statutorily required mens rea. Id. at 795-96. Finally, the Court held that due process does not require the prosecution to prove the defendant's sanity in all criminal cases. Id. at 798-99. Justice Frankfurter dissented because he believed sanity and culpability are inextricably related; thus, when sanity is in issue, the prosecution must prove the absence of insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 803-04.
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions, notably In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) , and Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684 (1975) , placed the vitality of Leland in question. In these later decisions, the Court appeared to be expanding a constitutional mandate that the prosecution bear the ultimate burden of proof for issues essential to a determination of guilt. See Comment, supra note 125, at 81-82. In Winship the Court held that due process requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt "every fact necessary to constitute the crime . . . charged." 397 U.S. at 364. This high standard of proof protects important interests of both the state and individual defendants because it reduces the risk of erroneous convictions
The idea that insanity negates mens rea rests on the assumption that mens rea contains an element of moral culpability.1 44 Since courts have traditionally viewed insane persons as incapable of appreciating what conduct is immoral, 14 5 they cannot possess mens rea, hence they based on factual errors, thereby maintaining the respect and confidence of the community in the criminal justice system. Id.
While Winship mandated only that a court determine whether a given fact was an element of the crime charged in order to decide whether the state could constitutionally allocate the burden of proving that fact to the accused, the Court subsequently extended Winship to factual issues which were not express elements of the crime as defined by statute. Note, supra note 95, at 507. The issue in Mullany was whether Maine could constitutionally require a defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. 421 U.S. at 684-85. The heat of passion defense would negate a presumption of malice, thereby reducing murder to manslaughter. Id. at 686-87. The Court struck down the Maine Rule, reasoning that it was contrary to Winship because the law relieved the prosecution of the burden of proving malice-the fact that differentiated murder and manslaughter-beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 699-701. While neither Wzzi)hip nor MAullany concerned the insanity defense per se, many commentators believed that the broad position enunciated in these cases overruled Lelandsub silentio. See United States v. Greene, 489 F.2d 1145 , 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1973 ) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) (reasoning that because the factual issue of sanity is an essential element of almost all crimes, Winship requires the prosecution always to prove sanity whenever a defendant places it in issue), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 977 (19-74) .
In 1976, however, the Court in Rivera v. Delaware did not take the opportunity to overrule a statute placing the burden of proof for insanity on the defendant. 429 U.S. 877 (1976) (appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question). A dismissal for want of a substantial federal question is treated as a decision on the merits and accorded precedential weight. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 343-45 (1975) . The Rivera decision thus effectively halts any lower court's attempt to extend the Mullan rule to insanity cases, as well as signals that the Leland rule is still valid. Comment, supra note 125, [89] [90] Finally, in Patterson v. New York, the Court upheld a New York statute placing the burden of proof for extreme emotional disturbance on the defendant, over the defendant's argument that, under Mullaney, this law was a violation of due process. 432 U. S. 197, 205-06 . The Court viewed this affirmative defense as a separate issue which did not negate any of the elements necessary to constitute the crime. Id. at 206-07. Therefore, once the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt the elements constituting the crime, the due process test of Winship was satisfied and the defendant could be required to sustain his defense. Id. at 206. For further discussion of Patterson, see Comment, supra note 125, at 90-95. 144 Note, supra note 34, at 503. The Court in Davis adopted this view of mens rea: " 'T~o constitute a crime against human laws, there must be, first, a vicious will; and, secondly, an unlawful act consequent upon such vicious will.'" 160 U.S. at 484 (quoting 4 W. BLACK-STONE, COMMENTARIES 195 (W. Lewis ed. 1898) are not blameworthy. 146 Under this view, proof of sanity is an essential element of the prosecution's case in chief.
147
The opposing view of mens rea is that it can exist even if the defendant is insane, thus proof of sanity is not an element of the case in chief.
148 First, the mere existence of the insanity defense suggests that insanity and mens rea are separate issues and that they are distinguishable, coexisting states of mind. As one commentator has stated, "If legal insanity is no more than an incapacity to possess the 'guilty mind' required for crime, then there is no reason to plead it as a special defense to criminal liability."' 49 In other words, if insanity were merely the absence of mens rea, the insanity defense would simply be a device for committing those who are not guilty of any criminal act. Moreover, although mens rea and insanity frequently involve similar factual determinations, "the insanity defense is broader than the mens rea concept. v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 773 (3d Cir. 1961 ) (anyone who lacks capacity to choose and to control himself could not possess "guilty mind" necessary for crime). In Currens the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit developed a new test for insanity which would relate mental disease to "guilty mind" or mens rea in a way that the jury could understand. For further discussion of Currens, see supra note 115. 
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INSANITY-REBUTTAL EXCEPTION simply engage in conduct purposely to cause the proscribed result. 55 To act knowingly, the person need only be "practically certain that his conduct will cause the forbidden result."
156 These definitions do not mandate that the person have either the ability to refrain from causing the result or the knowledge that causing the result is morally reprehensible. 157 1) Minimum Requirements of Culpability. Except as provided in section 2.05, a person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material element of the offense. 2) Kinds of culpability defined.
A) Purposely. A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when: 1) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and 2) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist. B) Knowingly.
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when: 1) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and 2) if the element involves the result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result. C) Recklessly.
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense which he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and the purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation.
D) Negligently
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purposes of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that would be exercised by a reasonable man in his situation. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) . 155 See supra note 154; Note, supra note 34, at 510. 156 Note, supra note 34, at 510-11. The mens ra standard and definition of insanity may occasionally coincide such that a defendant who pleads insanity will be required to disprove an essential element of the prosecution's case. Note, supra note 95, at 513. To determine whether or not they overlap to this extent requires a close analysis of the statutory language as to whether it requires deliberate and premeditated malice. Id. at 515. For example, the author of that Note contrasted two cases as follows. In United States v. Greene, 489 F.2d 1145 Greene, 489 F.2d (1973 , the defendant was charged with felony murder which did not require deliberate and premeditated malice, thus sanity was not an element of the offense. In United States v. Brawner, however, the prosecution had to show that the defendant acted in a deliberate, calculated manner in order to convict him of first degree murder. 471 F.2d 969, 998-99 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc). In Brawner, therefore, the prosecution had to prove these elements of mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt. See Note, supra note 95, at 516-18. That author emphasized, however, that this interrelationship occurs only in an extremely small number of cases. Id. at 513.
157 Note, supra note 95, at 511.
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Finally, the insanity tests focus on volitional impairment-the incapacity to refrain from causing a certain result-and cognitive impairment-the inability to know that causing the result is wrong. 58 One commentator illustrates the distinction as follows:
[A] person may be capable of formulating a plan with an awareness that carrying out the plan will likely result in the death of another, and yet be incapable of understanding the difference between right and wrong. In a state in which the mens rea for murder is premediation and the test of insanity is the M'Naghten Rule, there is no substantial overlap between the facts necessary to prove mens rea and the elements of insanity.
59
When mens rea is defined in terms of the conscious mind's cognitive and volitional functions, 16° a legally insane defendant can act in such a way as to satisfy the formal, definitional elements of the crime. Guilt, in the sense of whether the defendant committed all the specified elements of the crime, can thus be established prior to the determination of whether the defendant had the capacity to conform his conduct to the law. REV. 827, 834 (1977) ("most mentally abnormal offenders are fully capable of thinking about their criminal act before they do it, turning it over in their minds, planning the act, and then performing it in accordance with their preconceived plan").
160 See,e.g., State v. Sikora, 44 N.J. 453, 470, 210 A.2d 193, 202 (1965) ; Arenella, supra note 159, at 834.
161 In a bifurcated trial, the trial is formally split into a guilt phase and an insanity phase. This two stage procedure implies that guilt can be completely adjudicated without an inquiry into the defendant's sanity, since there would be no reason for bifurcation unless an insane defendant can entertain the required mens rea. Note, supra note 34, at 500. The purpose of bifurcation is to eliminate from the basic trial on guilt or innocence the mass of highly emotional evidence on the defendant's insanity which has no bearing on the issue of guilt. Louisell & Hazard, supra note 137, at 808 n.11. This objective has not been realized, at least in California. In People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53, 66 (1949) , the California Supreme Court held that evidence bearing on mental disease or defect was admissible on the mental state element in the guilt phase of the trial. This ruling has led Louisell and Hazard to advocate abolition of the bifurcated system. Louisell & Hazard, supra note 137, at 830; see also State v. Shaw, 106 Ariz. 103, 471 P.2d 715 (1970) (allowing evidence of mental illness in both portions of bifurcated trial emasculates the intended purposes of the bifuracted procedure; due process requires that evidence of mental illness be admissible in criminal trial because it is relevant to state of mind, thus bifurcated procedure denies defendants due process). But see Dix, supra note 151, at 575 (proposes restructuring the bifurcated system by splitting the phases between those issues involving proof of mental illness and those that do not).
Five Where the compelled testimony is used to determine guilt or the nature of punishment, however, the Court has found a violation of the fifth amendment.
6 7 The Court has reasoned that, because of the gravity of the decision made in the penalty phase, any attempt by the prosecution to establish the defendant's future dangerousness1 68 through compelled psychiatric testimony would contravene the fifth amendment. 69 Thus, the Court has found no distinction for fifth amendment purposes between the guilt and punishment phases of a capital case, 170 but has noted explicitly that this holding would not apply where the defendant raises the issue of sanity at trial.1 7 '
Other courts have held that if compelled psychiatric testimony is used only to support expert witnesses' conclusions that the defendant was sane at the time of the offense, and not to establish guilt, there is no question of self-incrimination. 172 As in the admission of illegally obtained evidence, the central question is whether the prosecution is using the compelled testimony to establish the defendant's guilt. The courts' conclusion that using compelled testimony to determine sanity does not create problems of self-incrimination, as it would if it were used to determine guilt, implicitly demonstrates that insanity and mens rea can coexist. To find otherwise would mean that courts are allowing the prosecution to use "illegal" evidence to establish an essential element of the crime charged, the mens rea. Proof of sanity is thus not part of the 166 Estelle, 451 U.S. at 462 (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 581 (1961) ). 167 Id. In Estelle, the prosecution introduced psychiatric testimony at the death penalty phase of a Texas murder trial, based upon a court-ordered psychiatric examination to determine the defendant's competency to stand trial. The defendant was not advised before the pre-trial psychiatric examination that he had a right to remain silent and that any statement he made could be used affirmatively to persuade the jury to return the death sentence. Id. Since the defendant had no opportunity to refuse to submit to an examination for that purpose, the Court held that admission of this testimony violated the defendant's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 469.
168 In Texas, capital cases require bifurcated proceedings-a guilt phase and a penalty phase. TEx. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 3.071(a) (Vernon 1981) . The judge must impose the death penalty if the jury affirmatively answers three questions on which the State has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. One of these questions is whether the defendant is likely to be dangerous in the future. Id. at 458. In Estelle, the State's psychiatrist testified that, among other things, Smith's previous behavior was irreversible, that he would commit other such criminal acts given the opportunity, and that he had "no remorse or sorrow for what he [had] done." Id. at 459-60. The jury answered the three questions affirmatively.
169 Id. at 463. 170 Id. at 462-63. 17 ' Id. at 466. 172 See, e.g., Whitock, 663 F.2d at 1107. There the court stated: "Had [the experts'] testimony been admitted for its tendency to buttress appellant's guilt, the self-incrimination question would generate grave concern. But the challenged testimony was elicited solely for the purpose of supporting the experts' conclusion that appellant was criminally responsible for her actions at the time of the offense." Id. (footnotes omitted).
stand. 20 9 Therefore, these courts allow the state to have its own psychiatrists examine the defendant and testify as to their conclusions. 2 10 This "testimony by proxy" theory is applicable to the situation where illegal evidence is used to rebut expert testimony on the defendant's insanity. Psychiatrists base their conclusions as to whether a defendant could appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct or was able to conform that conduct to the law upon the defendant's statements to them about the events. 21 1 Since the insanity defense allows defendants to "testify" through statements made to third parties without ever taking the stand, courts should not permit them to insulate themselves from impeachment and contradiction merely by testifying through proxies. 2 1 2 An expert's testimony should be subject to rebuttal with pertinent statements made by the defendant, such as in Finke, 2 1 3 or by lay testimony on the defendant's demeanor, as in Hinckey.214 The Hinckly court rejected the testimony by proxy theory because it could find no basis to distinguish the insanity defense from other affirmative defenses. 2 1 5 Yet the insanity defense does differ from other affirmative defenses such as alibi, duress and self-defense. 2 1 6 Rebuttal of these other affirmative defenses would go to the prosecution's case in chief because some of these defenses directly negate the criminal act charged, as with 209 Id. 210 Id. The Battie court stated that once the defendant introduces psychiatric testimony he waives his fifth amendment privilege "in the same manner as would the defendant's election to testify at trial." Id. at 701-02. Moreover, the Battie court held that the state's use of the results of an incompetency examination does not violate the fifth amendment because the state cannot use the results to prove any of the elements necessary to support imposition of a criminal punishment under state law. Id. at 701. The court found that any burden imposed on the defendant by this use of the results was more than justified by the difficulty the prosecution has in rebutting psychiatric testimony. Id. at 702. Finally, the court referred to the need to prevent fraudulent mental defenses as support for imposing a greater burden on the defense. Id.; see also F. INBAU, SELF-INCRIMINATION 52-65 (1950) 
